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Abstract
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is a very complex power plant and
plays a crucial role in Shuttle missions. To evaluate SSME performanace
1200 hot-fire ground tests have been conducted, varying in duration from
0 to 500 secs. During the test about 500 sensors are sampled every 20ms
to measure the various parameters. The sensors are generally bounded by
'red-lines' so that an excursion beyond the red-line could lead to
premature shutdown by the operator. In 27 tests, guided by the red-lines,
it was not possible to effect an orderly premature shutdown. These tests
became major incidents where serious damage to the SSME and the test
stand resulted. In this study we have investigated the application of
pattern recognition techniques to detect SSME performance trends that
lead to major incidents. Based on the sensor data a set of (n) features is
defined. At any time, during the test, the state of the SSME is given by a
point in the n-dimensional feature-space. The entire history of a given
test can now be represented as a trajectory in the n-dimensional feature
space. Portions of the 'normal' trajectories and the failed test
trajectories would lie in different regions of the n-dimensional feature
space. The feature space can now be partitioned into regions of
normal-tests and failed tests. In this manner it is possible to examine the
trajectory of a test in progress and predict if it "is heading into the
'normal-region' or the 'failure-region' of the n-dimensional feature space.
In this study we have developed techniques to extract features from
ground test data, as supplied by Rocketdyne, and develop feature space
trajectories for the tests. The initial results as presented here, look very
promising.
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The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) based on Hydrogen-Oxygen
combustion is a very complex power plant employing numerous pumps,
valves and ducts as shown in Fig.1. During a ground test about 500 sensors
are used to monitor the state of SSME. Some of these sensors are used for
the close loop control of SSME and are connected to a Computer System
'Engine Controller' as shown in Fig.2.
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There are 3 different data acquisition systems used to collect the sensor
data (1,2), namely,
-- Command and Data Simulator (CADS)
-- Facility Recording (FR), and
-- Analog High Frequency Recording (AHFR)
In Fig. 3, the salient points of these systems is shown. The engine
controller uses 16 bit computations on 12-bit data words to perform close
loop operation of the SSME. For the SSME Anomaly and Failure Detection
(SAFD) analysis, as reported in (2), the CADS and FR data provide the bulk
of the input.
In all about 1200 hot fire tests have been conducted on the SSME. In 27
tests the SSME went out of control and serious damage to the engine and
the teststand resulted. A summary of some of the salient points of the
ground tests is given in Table 1.
Considering that the replacement cost of an engine is ~$50M, it is highly
desirable to develop some technique for detecting failure trends which
would allow an orderly shutdown of the SSME and thereby preventing a
major incident (3). In (2) and (3) various techniques for failure detection
have been suggested including the following,
-- Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR)
-- Generalized Likelihood Test (GLT)
-- Voting
-- Confidence Region Tests
-- Kalman Filters
-- Parameter Estimation
-- Jump Processes
-- Pattern Recognition.
The success of a technique will be determined by;
-- detecting the fault fast enough to allow an orderly shutdown
-- identifying the technical nature of the fault.
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Fig. 3 SSME Data Acquisition Sys_m
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TABLE 1. GROUND TEST SUMMARY
m -1200 HOT- FIRES
- -27 MAJOR INCIDENTS
- -TEST DURATION 0-500 SEC.
- -300-500 SENSORS MONITORED
--SAMPLING RATE 50 Hz.
- -DATA WORD 12 bits
--DATA TRANSFER RATE 0.5-1Mhz
- -DATA VOLUME 0.1 - 1Gbits
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......... ,.,,,., ,.,, ,.=, ,u, , ,J_,, uu_[ Be aescnoea by the 'weighted truth-table'
in Fig. 4 which shows the probability W for various actions.
SAFD
Decision
continue
normal 1
failure
shut-
down
Ideally, W1=W4=1 & W2=W3=0
Fig. 4 SAFD performance matrix.
Note that W2 being the probability of a false alarm should be zero,
however, a small value ,say 1%, may be acceptable. On the other hand W3
being the probability of a miss should indeed be zero, just as W4 should be
1. Various alternatives have been considered for implementing such a
SAFD. We shall consider the use of Pattern Recognition (PR) techniques for
SAFD. It should also be pointed out that much of the data processing in PR,
as described below, can also be used for the other vital activities
envisaged for the future systems, namely, real-time control, health
assessment amd condition monitoring (4,5).
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Pattern Recognition (PR)
The fundamental premise for applying PR techniques is the observation
that when systems fail due to internal causes there are always some
warning signs that preceed the event. Furthermore, the progression of a
system from normal operating mode to anomalous (failure) mode does not
happen at random but follows a pattern which can be analysed and
explained. The object of PR technique, described here, is to identify the
patterns that have led to failures and use this knowledge to look for
warning signs in future tests and predict failures well in advance of their
occurence.
The current practice is based on red-lining the sensor outputs. The
red-lining of n-sensors can be easily explained in terms of a polyhedron in
n-dimensions as shown in Figs. 5(a,b,c). Each sensor is assigned a lower-
and an upper-bound value for 'normal' operation and these define the two
'red-lines' for that sensor. For a 3-sensor case the state of the system, at
a given time, can uniquely be defined by a point in the rectangular
prismatic region of the $1-S2-$3 Space (S-Space), Fig. 5c. The collection
of these state-points at successive times would define a trajectory in the
S-Space. All the possible normal runs of the system would then be given by
trajectories that lie entirely within the 'red-lined' rectangular prism as
shown in Fig. 6. In principle, any trajectory that tends to approach a
boundary and exit to the outside region is an indication of an imminent
failure.
One can learn to detect the failure trends by examining the data of the 27
tests that resulted in failure and compare it with the normal test data. It
is quite possible that the failure trajectories will reveal their different
character (as compared to normal trajectories) even before coming close
to the red-line polyhedron boundary as shown in Fig. 7.
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There are two points that have to be considered in this context, namely,
1. The straight forward fixed red-lines for a sensor are adequate only for
very special cases where no coupling among the sensors exists, i. e. the
red-line for a given sensor is independent of the values of all the other
parameters as measured by the rest of the sensors. Let r k be the red-line
for the kth sensor, then
rk = c k, where c's are constants
The software red-lines can be defined by replaing c's by functions fk so
that,
rk=fk(S1,S2,... Sn), where Sk is the kth sensor reading
In real-time this implies that as the test is progressing the readings S k
are used to calculate the various rk's through fk's. This can become not
only computationally quite cumbersome but the explicit form of fk itself
has to be known perhaps from a simulation model of the system. In
principle, it is simple to build the simulation model in a modular manner
(6), however, the ad hoc nature of such models leads to different control
and real-time simulation models. By such models it is quite possible to
determine most of the fk's, however, some crucial gaps may exist in this
knowledge since not all the failure mechanisms are well understood.
2. Even if the fk's are known and the soft red-lines can be determined,
there is yet another serious problem. In principle all red-lines, soft or
otherwise, are based on a single time frame of the system without
considering how the system got to the state represented by the time
frame. Questions of the type; has the system reached its present state
through a transient, slow drift, excessive noise or under a close-loop
command etc., are not considered by red-line methods. The method
proposed here considers the entire system trajectory and compares it with
other trajectories to detect failure prone trajectories.
The PR technique we propose to employ here has two important steps,
-- extension of the sensor-space into Feature Space
--Segmentation of the feature-space into normal- and failure-regions
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Feature Space
The sensor space discussed above has two major drawbacks, namely,
-- For a truly multi-sensor system such as SSME the total amount of data
is too large (about 100 Mbits) and can become too unwieldy for real-time
processing.
On the other hand most of the data is of routine nature and a tremendous
amount of data compression can be achieved by isolating and analysing
only the deviations from the norm or the steady state. The norms can be
defined as those values which can be calculated or predicted (assuming
normal SSME operation) from a few key parameters e. g. power level, MCC
pressure, throttle position etc. In the simplest case, only the deviations in
sensor values, as compared to a moving average defined over a certain
interval, are to be used for further analysis. This may even include
deviations caused by closed- or open-loop control commands as may
happen during throttling.
-- The sensor space, as based only on the sensor values, may not highlight
the features important for SAFD.
This is based on the fact that the raw sensor readings, along with their
red-lines, may themselves be not good indicators of impending failure.
Further processing is often required to calculate features which are
directly related to the failure modes. In Fig. 8 we show some of the
features that can be defined for a given sensor. Starting with the raw
value one can calculate first an average over a certain interval and then
the deviation from it. From these one can also calculate the signal to noise
ratio SIN which could be another feature. To detect drifts one can also
calculate the local gradients as another feature. Similarly Fourier
Transform of the signal (or the deviation), over a given time window, can
be another feature, as shown in Fig. 8. One can also define 'compound'
features involving data from more than one sensor. Thus, if needed, the
net thermal flux, which may not be measured by a single sensor, can be
calculated from the presure, flow velocity and temperature as measured
by sensors in the MCC and it can be used as a feature for failure detection.
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Based on the above discussion, the sensor space is replaced by a
feature-time space, where a feature is defined as the deviation from the
norm or steady-state as calculated from some key parameters or by
averaging over a specified interval. The state of SSME, at any given time
will thus be represented by a state point in the feature space. In Fig. 9 a
normal SSME run is shown in a two-feature space. In a normal run, all the
state points cluster around the time axis as shown, since no large
deviations are encountered.
Value Devatn Grad
v v'=v-<v> v'/dt FT(v')
Fig. 8 Sensor Values & Features
F2
muO • • am • aa awu • • • umuOuO0 • •
F/ Time
Fig. 9 Feature Space Representation of
Normal SSME Test
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Segmentation
Segmentation is the process of partitioning the feature space into
clusters that can be identified with definite states of the system e. g.
pre-failure or normal. An idealised illustration of this is shown in Fig.10
where the entire feature space has been projected along the time axis. All
the points representing the normal runs should lie in a small region,
cluster 1, around the origin. During normal runs there are large deviations
caused by genuine excursions such as throttling etc. Such states of the
system might show up as another region, cluster 2. It is anticipated that
the deviations due to the failure modes will be of different nature and
hopefully form another distinct region, cluster 3. An another form of the
same situation is depicted in Fig.11 where an entire run is represented by
a trajectory. A steady run trajectory would then lie entirely within
cluster 1 whereas a controlled excursion in a run might cause the
trajectory to migrate to cluste 2, but eventually return to cluster 1 after
the steady state has been reached.
In practice, the situation may not be quite so clean cut, the clusters may
not have so well defined boundaries and they may overlap. A number of
powerful statistical techniques is available to locate cluster boundaries
in such cases It is also possible to assign to each state point, the
probability of membership to a given cluster. One can also define a
distance metric in the feature space to group points in clusters. In Table 2.
(7) some of the commonly employed distance measures and the associated
error bounds are shown.
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Table 2. Distance Measure and Error Bounds
Name Expremsiun
---1 i
Kela¢lonships
Baycs =rror probability
I) Equivocation or Shannon
enu'ccy
2) A_,_'ap condiliona| quad-
ratic entropy [Vajda (1970)1
3) kycsian dw [Devijver
(1974)]
4) Minko_,ki measures of non-
unU'ornuty ['Toussaim (! 973)]
5) Blmttacharp/a bound [see
gaULam (1967)l
6) Chernoff bound [see Kailath
(1967)1
7) Kolmolorov variational
di_ulmC¢ [see KaJlath (1967)]
8) Genendized Kolmogorov
distance {Devijver ('i974),
and Fu (1973)]
9) A family of apl2roximatin$
fuacuons {I1o (1972)J
10) The Matusitl distance (see
Kailath (1967)1
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Q.(nlX) " ½ - ][E{[P.(wllz)
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C/w Bowldl
K! - B(_IX)]
< ,% < [] - #mlx)J
m-I
- k(nlX) - R,.,, - -- - Mo(nlX);
P. < "'" < Rsm < "" < R._ < R,..
[see Cover and Heat (1967) and D_,i_r (1974)l
Two C/,_ llomde
.,_m,tqo_,,',.o,:+..s _2 :_ :.<,,,,.,-,);
Iml j m0,+, I
t(t - (s,(nl,r)P"} < P, < t(! - .r,(nlX_}.
fors> !;
upper bound equals (I - B(QfX)], when a ,,, 2;
Q.o. < Q.; Qo - I - a' (.qlX);
7 liVeS the same bound as b(gll,lf);
two-clau bound relations:
P. < Q.(NIX) S Qe(I_IX) S ½H(nlX') S b(_lJO
[_ lto (19"/2) and H¢llnum and Raviv (!970)J
Notation: f_ 1 (w,. i m 1,2. • • ca: 2 < m < :_)---a set of pattern classes; P_ is an Q priori probability oi" class w_; X is • n dimensional vector
random variable; S. is a sample space of X; p(Xiw,) is a conditional probability density function; P.(w, IX) is a posterior probability
o( cJa.U w_ conditioned on X;/(X) I. _','., P, pgx:w,).--th¢ mtxtune dismbution; --¢is an expectation over S. with resp_t tO/(X);
Rsw is an m _ infinite sample c_earest-nc|i_eor risk; R_,,,, is a k near_-neil_bor rug.
the steps employed in the above technique are;
-- definition of the features and construction of the feature space
-- plotting of ground test data (of both normal and failure tests)
trajectories in the feature space
-- segmentation of trajectories into failure and normalruns.
Implementation of these steps in practice is discussed nelow.
as
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Results and Conclusions
the data from a run is stored on a number of magnetic tapes . the data for
a short interval (10-100 sec.) and from a few imortant ssrs is combined
into a single tape file. This tape file is read into a disk file which can be
accessed by application programs. Fig. 12 shows the header, or the
Run-Log, of the disk data file. This data, as can be seen from the first line,
is for the time period 320 to 392 secs. of the run #901-364 which
resulted in a failure. It also shows the ssr PID#, the engineering unit used
and the SSME component mnemonic.
90t8364R:1t
367 RP
940 GP
395 GP
410 RP
480 GP
459 AP
764 RM
854 GP
858 GP
878 GP
879 IC
883 DP
320._0000 392.15008
HCCH.G. IN3 PR
HPFPCLNTLN PR
MCCOX IN3 PR
FPB PC NFD
OPB PC
HPFP DS PR NFD
HPFP SPD NFD
FAC OX FH DS PR
ENG OX IN PR I
HX INT PR
HX INT T
HX VENT DP
Fig. 12 Data File Header
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An interactive, menu driven program has been written to process the data
and extract the features. In Fig. 13 a beginning MENU of the program is
shown. Various types of operations are available by choosing the
appropriate code. these operations include both recursuve and
non-recursive filters, data compression, Logical Operations, FFT,
Look-Up-Tables etc.
3 395 GP HCCOX IN3 PR
4 41g RP FPB PC NFD
5 48g GP OPBPC
G 459 tiP HPFP DS PR NFD
? ?64 RM HPFP SPD NFD
B 854 GP FfiC OX FH DS PR
9 858 GP ENGOX IN PR t
tg BTB GP HX INT PR
tt 879 IC HX ]NT T
12 883 DP HX VENT DP
" " TYPE SEQI'S OF COMPONENTS, END HITH g
i
g
TYPE ! OF DRiftPOINTS TO REfiD(LT.3000). O=EXIT
3308
! ! ! ! CHOOSE OPTION BY TYPING I t ! !
DfiTfi COMPRESS* = , = = e =t
NON-RECFLTR e = = = = ¢ =2
RECURSIVEFILTER = , e , =3
NRM-OPRNS= = t = = ¢ = = =4
FFT * * * = = = = = = = = =S
EXIT = : : = : = =0
Fig. 13 Operations MENU
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The first step is to read the raw data for a ssr by choosing the appropriate
PID#. In Fig. 14 the data for PID#367, for the entire duration of 320 to 392
seconds is shown
3655
_££ H. 6. INJ PR R364 PID367
1-1(3----02-1
3658
3645
3648
3635
3638
3625
3628
3615
320
FILES: I=FORBI) I. DRT;486
Fig. 14. MOO H. G. INJ PR, PID #367, RUN 901-364
From the above figure it is clear that the data has some structure in the
form of some distinct features, however, the noise level is fairly high to
mask them. the first step we have taken is to reduce the 'observational
sampling rate' through moving average. This is done in the following three
steps;
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1. Select a window size N -- 0, 1, 2 ....
Let M = 2N + 1
2. Form signal averages .8._k from the raw signal S i
.,,S..k = _ Si/M;
where k -- N+I, 2N+1, 3N+1, .2rN+l, . and
i -- k-N, k-N+1, .k+N
3. Replace the original signal S i by S k. the sampling rate in the new
signal, S k , is reduced by a factor of N.
In Fig. 15 the sampling rate of the data in Fig. 14 has been reduced by N,,9,
or compressed by a factor of 9. the program allows an interactive choice
of N. the data in Fig. 15 still seems to have some noise which can be
removed by various filtering techniques. As an illustration Fig. 16 shows
the result of applying a non-recursive to the data of Fig. 15.
the data in Fig. 16 seems to have two distinct features, namely, a
predominant frequency and a 'drifting background'. To separate these two
components one can determine local averages over an interval larger than
the hi-freq, wavelength as shown by the background line in Fig. 17. from
this one can determine the zero-crossing points. A smooth curve can be
fitted to these points to determine the background, as shown in Fig. 18.
the background level, as found in Fig. 18 can now be subtracted from Fig.16
to give the hi-freq, component of the signal, as shown in Fig. 19. This
signal can further be 'smoothed' to yield a 'cleaner' hi-freq, signal, as
shown in Fig. 20.
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Fig. 15 Reduced Sampling Rate Data, PID#367
R365 3.3K/10
1-10-----'02-i
3658-
3645-
3648-
3635-
3638-
3625-
3620-
320
I
I I, ,11
I
338 34(3
 Ji,!'till II 'l'' I
I
I I I I I
358 368 378 388 390
FILES: I=FOR881. DRT=495
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Fig. 16 High-Pass Filtered Data, PID#367
3.644-
R364 3.3K/18 RECF-4
I-IG_---_)3-1
3642-
364
3638
3636
3634
3632
3630
3628
3626
3624
328 338
o
340 35@ 368 378 388 398
FILES: 1=FOROO1.DAI;495
XIV-20
Fig. 17 Zero Crossing Points, PID#367
3658
C 1 - 3K- 10C01'1P-4REC
1 -i 0---,92-1 X-------_ .3 - !
3645
3648
3635
3638
3625 I!
3620
320
I
IV I '
i
3 O ;48
Y
350 ::6(_ 370 3:30
FILES: 1=FOROO1. D_T;qS3
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Fig. 18 Background Trend, PID#367
3644-
3642-
3640-
363
363
363
3632-
3638-
3
3
362
R364 3.3K/18 RECF-4+RECF-I8
I-I_4-I
//
I
_J
I ! I
328 338 348
l ! ! i
350 368 370 380 390
FILES: I=FORBBI.DAT:495
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Fig. 19 High Frequency Data, PID#367
R364 3.3K/18 REC4-REC18
I-IG--_EbS-I
328 339 349 358 368 3T@ 389 398
FILES: I=FOR881 .DRT:495
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Fig. 20 Smoothed Hi-Freq Data, PID#367
R364 3.3K/10 R3[R4-(R4÷R18)]
1-10---_-_6-1
I 88
8 75
8 5O
0 25 ' /
-8 25
-8 58
-O 75
-I O0 I
-! 25
320
i i
/i/
i ,
ii
! i
330
i i
340 350 360 370 380
i
-,q
FILES: I=FOROOI.DAT:497
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the original signal of Fig. 14 can now be said to have two distinct features
as represented by Figs. 18 & 20. the former is a slow drift with with
plateaus, whereas the latter is a high frequency jitter, which, if needed,
can be Fourier analysed. This drift and the high frequency can now be
taken as features for representation in the feature space as discussed
earlier.
the above steps can now be repeated for the other sensors, the
accumulation of all such ssrs and their features can be put in a single
time-feature file to construct trajectories, the present computer
facilities, with the limited memory allocation and the lack of on-line
graphics, did not allow such implementation. A demonstration of this,
however, was realised off-line at UAH facility and presented as a video
film at MSFC.
From this study, the design of a comprehensive system to analyse the
SSME ground test data has been made. the system should consist of;
1. A double density (6250/1600 bpi) tape drive interfaced to the host
VAX/VMS environment.
2. An on-lne RGB graphics display.
3. At least 20M disk memory.
4. A graphics kernel with hooks to application environment.
5. A two tiered version of software for interactive development and macro
oriented operation.
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Conclusions
-- A feature space description of the SSME ground test data has been
realised.
-- An interactive program has been written to extract features from the
ground test data.
-- Techniques of pattern recognition have been identified to measure the
deviations from the normal runs
-- A design of a more comprehensive program has been made to;
A. Survey a large number of normal runs (about 50), and
B. Survey all the failed runs (27) and compare them with the above.
-- Considering that an overall comprehensive review of neither the normal
nor the failed runs exists it is highly recommended that an analysis
environment of the type discussed above, be implemented.
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